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Increasing attention is being focused on the role of military expendi-
tures in contributing to the external indebtedness of developing countries. 
Unfortunately, given the fungibility of funds, it is often difficult to find 
clear, statistically significant relationships between increases in defense ex-
penditures and the subsequent expansion of foreign liabilities. 
These dilemmas are reflected in seemingly contradictory results pro-
duced by several recent studies of Pakistani borrowing in external markets. 
On the one hand, cross section analysis (Looney, 1987, 1989; Looney and 
Frederiksen, 1986) suggests that Pakistan as a relatively resource constrain-
ed country might be expected to resort to extensive borrowing to support 
its level of defense expenditures. On the other hand, time series analysis 
questions whether external borrowing has been a major factor in funding 
the country's expanded defense expenditures (Looney, 1991). If anything, 
this analysis suggests that foreign lender concern over Pakistan's defense 
expenditures have caused them to cut back on lending to that country. 
There are several ways these two sets of findings can be reconciled: 
1. The cross section analysis is largely for the 1970s and early 1980s, 
and the patterns found there may not have held up in subsequent years. 
2. Pakistan may not be a "typical" resource constrained country. The 
country has received considerable amounts of economic aid and, as recent 
. studies suggest, this may be quite fungible into the military acquisition 
process. 
3. As was the case for domestic borrowing, the time series analysis 
. 
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must, given the nature of the data, focus on longer run trends. Much of the 
external borrowing for defense could be of a short term nature and therefore 
not picked up by the causation tests. 
To this list one could also add the fact that figures on total external 
borrowing may mask developments in individual categories. For example 
the country could be funding defense from one external source, but other 
external sources may actually cut back lending when they feel the country's 
allocations to the military have become excessive. 
The purpose of the analysis below is to explore these latter two possibil-
ities. In particular how have Pakistani defense expenditures affected year-to 
year fluctuations in that country's external debt position? Have these pat-
terns been similar across different sources of external funding? Have the 
imperatives of debt service and/or willingness of external lenders affected 
the expansion of defense expenditures? 
Background 
Pakistan's total debt rose from around 30.6 million 1985 Rupees in 
1953 to 462 million in 1989 (IMF). Year to year growth has been fairly 
erratic with debt increasing by 77 percent in 1972 and declining by 12 
percent in 1973. However since 1982 the government's indebtedness has 
shown fairly steady year-to-year growth. There have been several notable 
shifts in the composition of this debt (Table 1): 
1. Borrowing from the State Bank has gradually declined over time. In 
the early 1960s this source accounted for around one half of the govern-
ment's borrowing. This figure had fallen to around 20 percent by the early 
1980s. By the end of the 1980s it had fallen even further to around 15 
percent. ~ 
2. Borrowing has also shifted from deposit banks with this source 
holding about 20 percent of the public sector's debt in the early 1960s. .~. 
After falling below 10 percent in the early 1970s and rising to nearly 15 "" 
percent in 1980, debt held by this source appears to have leveled off at 
around 10 percent of outstanding issues. 
3. Borrowing from other financial institutions (presumably all domestic) 
has not been significant - in recent years it has accounted for around 15 to 
20 percent of the government's ontstanding obligations. 
4. The debt held by international institutions has fluctuated fairly 
widely. In the early 1950s this source accounted for around 15 percent of 
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PAKISTAN: EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC SECTOR INDEBTEDNESS 
EXPENDITURES AND PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT, 1953-1989 
(billion 1985 rupees) 
Total Debt Share Held By 
State Deposit Other Inter- Foreign 
Amount Growth Bank Money Finan. !national Govts, Banks lnstitut. Institut. Banks 
30.63 - 41.12 16.52 0.31 12.81 1.54 
33.02 7.79 42.22 16.96 0.42 11.82 2.12 
33.37 1.08 34.99 18.06 1.23 16.50 2.65 
37.00 10.87 44.04 15.29 2.44 13.25 2.33 
41.95 13.37 47.12 15.20 2.86 10.87 2.07 
39.91 -4.86 52.60 16.11 3.48 3.93 2.41 
41.35 3.60 47.79 8.87 2.68 5.31 2.45 
41.27 -0.19 48.21 9.11 2.83 5.38 2.46 
39.12 -5.20 49.54 19.55 3.34 5.15 2.98 
41.44 5.92 47.02 8.89 3.26 5.39 3.68 
48.76 17.68 40.16 16.30 2.84 5.14 12.05 
56.01 14.85 37.54 14.88 2.51 4.66 21.77 
62.94 12.37 32.28 4.14 1.95 5.60 29.38 
75.42 19.84 34.97 11.19 1.76 6.05 •31.71 
74.82 -0.80 31.43 9.83 1.58 7.87 36.54 
80.01 6.93 28.54 0.13 1.68 9.48 37.80 
88.77 10.95 24.81 11.41 1.60 9.52 41.01 
102.94 15.96 28.52 9.68 1.44 8.73 41.27 
112.00 8.80 28.71 8.61 1.30 8.16 42.51 
198.67 77.38 17.45 7.36 0.66 11.23 54.94 
174.73 -12.05 17.57 9.97 0.79 11.22 53.25 
157.15 -10.06 14.20 8.05 0.87 10.76 57.83 
136.49 -13.15 15.69 9.16 0.83 10.57 53.47 
152.88 12.01 16.25 10.89 1.00 9.41 53.61 
160.67 5.09 18.00 10.99 1.18 9.22 52.88 
167.46 4.23 16.45 12.94 1.19 10.54 50.13 
190.20 13.57 20.74 12.31 1.23 9.80 48.13 
186.94 -1.72 19.82 14.90 1.31 9.79 45.70 
176.80 -5.42 19.21 14.52 1.88 10.30 44.86 
214.51 21.33 19.54 11.70 1.78 10.91 45.98 
227.73 6.16 13.66 13.06 2.02 14.15 41.61 
238.03 4.52 15.63 10.16 1.90 14.72 38.50 
284.09 19.35 19.26 10.66 1.44 14.63 34.71 
348.88 22.81 16.60 10.82 1.40 13.78 32.56 
381.74 9.42 13.51 11.06 2.09 13.90 31.46 
416.09 9.00 16.65 12.86 1.87 14.18 28.03 








































SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, Internatio'!al Financial Statistics Yearbook, various 
issues. 
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This fell to around 5 percent during most of the 1960s. Since the early 
1970s debt held by this source has risen fairly steadily so that by 1989 
around 16 percent of the government's debt was held by these organizations. 
5. The most dramatic movements in debt have come from fluctuations 
in issues held by foreign governments and banks. Lending from this source 
was rather insignificant (around 2-3 percent of outstanding debt) until .the 
mid 1960s. By 1970 these organizations held around 40 percent of the 
public sector's debts. This reached nearly 58 percent in 1974, but since that 
time their share had gradually fallen to around 28 percent in 1989. 
6. Debt held by "Other" organizations has also fluctuated widely, 
averaging about 20 percent in the 1950s and early 1960s. This figure fell to 
around 10 percent in 1970. This source of funding was relatively unimpor-
tant during most of the 1970s, usually averaging less than 10 percent. 
However, since 1979 borrowing from this source has increased fairly rapid-
ly so that by 1989 it accounted for around 28 percent of total government 
indebtedness. 
The patterns suggest that over time the authorities have gradually 
shifted to external sources of funding. No doubt this has been precipitated 
by the country's lagging foreign exchange earnings and rapidly growing 
import requirements. They may also be indicative of increased levels of 
arms imports. Particularly that from foreign governments and banks during 
the period of rapid defense expenditures in the 1960s. 
As noted earlier, little empirical research has been undertaken on the 
link between defense expenditures and external indebtedness. Intuitively if 
these patterns exist one might imagine increased military expenditures to 
lead to follow on borrowing as the stream of spare parts, components, 
maintenance and the like expand over time. On the other hand, if lenders 
are unwilling to extend credit for the purpose of increasing military expendi-
tures (but are willing to lend for other purposes) one might expect causation 
to be from increased debt to expanded military expenditures - the gov-
ernment borrows say for economic projects, but manages to divert funds to 
the military. In either case the impacts between debt and military expendi-
tures would be positive (Khilji and Zampelli, 1991). 
Recent research has indicated that another pattern may be present. In 
his analysis of defense expenditures and debt service in the South East 
Asian countries Snider ( 1990) found that increases in the previous year's 
debt service burden dampened increases in military expenditures as a percent-
age of central government expenditures. Specifically, a one percent increase 
in the previous year's debt service ratio accounted for an average decrease 
of two percent in the military's share of the total budget. 
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The link between debt and military expenditures may be even more 
complex: Snider suggests that countries that undergo frequent IMF stabiliza-
tion policies may actually have increases in military expenditures. Specifical-
ly, he finds that the more frequently a Third World debtor must resort to 
Fund-approved economic stabilization programs, the greater the military 
share of central government expenditures (Snider, 1990, pp. 295-96): 
When a debtor government must adopt a Fund-supported stabilization program, 
military expenditures increase by an average of about two and a half percent. The 
less able a government is to mobilize the resources at its nominal disposal, the. 
greater the debt service ratio and the more frequently it must adopt Fund-supported 
stabilization programs. In other words the less a government can mobilize and direct 
the human and material resources under its symbolic control the more it must spend 
on the military for political survival... Hence (because of the unpopularity of stabili-
zation programs), politically weak governments which adopt such packages may 
increase security expenditures as a hedge against an increase in domestic political 
unrest, in response to new austerity measures. 
Clearly one must resolve the issue of causation between military expen-
ditures and debt before any definitive conclusions can be drawn as to the 
role of defense allocations in affecting a country's external indebtedness. 
The Issue of Causation 
The main questions we want to resolve here is: ( 1) to which extent 
expanded rates of expenditures have been financed with increased resort to 
expanded indebtedness in external markets? Do accelerations in expendi-
tures necessarily lead to corresponding increases in indebtedness and if 
so after what time? (2) whether expanded indebtedness subsequently 
constrains the government's ability (or willingness) to sustain or increase 
allocations to defense; (3) if these constraints exist are they more stringent 
for loans for defense or non-defense activities? and ( 4) do any of the 
observed patterns between expenditure and debt vary by source of funding? 
Ultimately, any statistical test for causation will be based on a number 
of arbitrary assumptions. Still, using a number of alternative specifications 
for the key variables it is possible to make some credible inferences concern-
ing the timing of savings and GDP or of savings and private investment. 
The original and most widely used causality test was developed by 
Granger (1969). According to this test (using expenditures and debt), debt 
(DEBT) affects the growth in expenditures (EXP) if this series ( expendi-
tures) can be predicted more accurately by past values of debt than by its 
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past rates of growth. To be certain that causality runs from debt to expendi-
tures, past growth rates in debt must also be more accurate than past values 
of expenditures in predicting increases in debt. 
Granger Test. - More formally, Granger (1969) defines causality such that 
X Granger causes (G-C) Y if Y can be predicted more accurately in the 
sense of mean square error, with the use of past values of X than without 
using past X. Based upon the definition of Granger causality, a simple 
bivariate autoregressive (AR) model for expenditures (EXP) and debt 
(DEBT) can be specified as follows: 
p q 
(1) DEBT(t)=c+ I a(i)DEBT(t-i)+ I b(j)EXP(t-j)+u(t) 
i=l f=l 
r s 
(2) EXP (t) = c + I d (i) EXP (t - i) + I e (j) DEBT (t - j) + v (t) 
i=l f =l 
where DEBT is the growth in public sector debt and EXP = the growth in 
public expenditures (both defense and non-defense); p, q, r and s are lag 
lengths for each variable in the equation; and u and v are serially uncorre-
lated white noise residuals. By assuming that error terms (u, v) are "nice" 
ordinary least squares (OLS) becomes the appropriate estimation method 1• 
Within the framework of unrestricted and restricted models, a joint 
F-test is appropriate for causal detection. Where: 
(3) F = (RSS (r) - RSS (u))/(d/ (r) - d/(u)) 
RSS (u)/d/ (u) 
RSS (r) and RSS (u) are the residual sum of squares of restricted and unre-
stricted models, respectively; and d/(r) and df (u) are, respectively, the de-
grees of freedom in restricted and unrestricted models. 
The Granger test detects causal directions in the following manner: 
first, unidirectional causality from EXP to DEBT if the F-test rejects the 
null hypothesis that past values of EXP in equation ( 1) are insignificantly 
different from zero and if the F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
past values of DEBT in equation (2) are insignificantly different from zero. 
' If the disturbances of the model were serially correlated, the OLS estimates would be 
inefficient, although still unbiased, and wQuld distort the causal relations. The existence of 
serial correlation was checked by using a maximum likelihood correlation for the first-order 
autocorrelation of the residuals [AR (1)]. The comparison of both OLS and AR (1) results 
indicated that no significant changes appeared in causal directions. Therefore, we can conclude 
"roughly" that serial correlation was not serious in this model. 
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That is, EXP causes DEBT but DEBT does not cause EXP. Unidirectional 
causality runs from DEBT to EXP if the reverse is true. Second, bi-direction-
al causality runs between EXP and DEBT if both F-test ,statistics reject the 
null hypotheses in equations ( 1) and ( 2). Finally, no causality exists 
between EXP and DEBT if we can not reject both null hypotheses at the 
conventional significance level. 
The results of Granger causality tests depend critically on the choice 
of lag length. If the chosen lag length is less than the true lag length, the 
omission of relevant lags can cause bias. If the chosen lag is greater than the 
true lag length, the inclusion of irrelevant lags causes estimates to be ineffi-
cient. While it is possible to choose lag lengths based on preliminary partial 
autocorrelation methods, there is no a priori reason to assume lag lengths 
equal for all types of deficits. 
The Hsiao Procedure. - To overcome the difficulties noted above, Hsiao 
(1981) developed a systematic method for assigning lags. This method 
combines Granger Causality and Akaike's final prediction error (FPE), the 
(asymptotic) mean square prediction error, to determine the optimum lag 
for each variable. In a paper examining the problems encountered in choos-
ing lag lengths, Thornton and Batten (1985) found Hsiao's method to be 
superior to both arbitrary lag length selection and several other systematic 
procedures for determining lag length. 
The first step in Hsiao's procedure is to perform a series of autoregres-
sive regression on the dependent variable. In the first regression, the de-
pendent variable has a lag of one. This increases by one in each succeeding 
regression. Here, we estimate M regressions of the form: 
m 
( 4) G (t) = a + :E b (t - i) G (t - i) + e (i) 
i = l 
where the values of m range from 1 to M. For each regression, we compute 
the FPE in the following manner 
(5) FPE (m) = T + m + 1 ESS (m)/T T-m-1 
Where: Tis the sample size, and FPE (m) and ESS (m) are the final predic-
tion error and the sum of squared errors, respectively. The optimal lag 
length, m*, is the lag length which prodtices the lowest FPE. Having deter-
mined m* additional regressions expand the equation with the lags on the 
other variable added sequentially in the same manner used to determine m*. 
Thus we estimate four regressions of the form: 
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m• n 
(6) G(t) =a+ I b(t- i)G(t- 1) + I c(t- i)D(t- 1) + e(i) 
i=l i=l 
with n ranging from one to four. Computing the final prediction error for 
each regression as: 
FPE (m*, n) = T + m* + n + l ESS (m*, n)/T 
T - m* - n - 1 
we choose the optimal lag length for D, n* as the lag length which produces 
the lowest FPE. Using the final prediction error to determine lag length is 
equivalent to using a series of F tests with variable levels of significance 2 • 
The first term measures the estimation error and the second term 
measures the modeling error. The FPE criterion has a certain optimality 
property that "balances the risk due to bias when a lower order is selected 
and the risk due to increases in the variance when a higher order is selected 
(Hsiao, 1979, p. 326)". As noted by Judge et al. (1982), an intuitive reason 
for using the FPE criterion is that longer lags increase the first term but 
decrease the RSS of the second term, and thus the two opposing forces are 
optimally balanced when their product reaches its minimum. 
Depending on the value of the final prediction errors, four cases are 
possible: (a) Expenditures cause Debt when the prediction error for debt 
decreases when expenditures are included in the debt equation. In addition, 
when debt is added to the expenditure equation, the final prediction error 
should increase; (b) Debt causes Expenditures when the prediction error for 
expenditures increases when expenditures are added to the regression equa-
tion for debt, and is reduced when debt is added to the regression equation 
for expenditures; (c) Feedback occurs when the final prediction error de-
creases when expenditures are added to the debt equation, and the final 
prediction error decreases when debt is added to the expenditure equation; 
and (d) No Relationship exists when the final prediction error increases 
both when expenditures are added to the debt equation and when debt is 
added to the expenditures equation. 
Operational Procedures 
The data used to carry out the causation tests were deflated by the 
GDP deflator and are in constant 1985 prices. For best statistical results 
2 Since the F statistic is redundant in this instance it is not reported here. It is, however, 
available from the author upon request. 
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(Hsiao, 1981; Joerding, 1986), the variables were transformed into their 
annual growth rates 3 • 
Relationships were considered valid if they were statistically significant 
at the ninety-five percent level of confidence. That is, if ninety-five percent 
of the time we could conclude that they had not occurred by pure chance, 
we considered them statistically significant. 
As noted above, there is no theoretical reason to believe that expendi-
ture aggregates and changes in debts have a set lag relationship - that is 
they impact on one another over a fixed time period. To find the optimal 
adjustment period of impact, lag structures of up to four years were 
estimated. The lag structure with the highest level of statistical significance 
was the one chosen best depicting the relationship under consideration (the 
optimal lag reported in Tables 2-4). To assess the robustness of our findings 
definitions of tests were undertaken for the growth in the share of expendi-
tures (total, defense and non-defense) in GDP as well as the actual growth 
rates of these categories. 
Results 
As a basis for comparison, causation tests were first performed on total 
public sector debt. Surprisingly, few statistically significant relationships 
could be found for the period as a whole (Table 2) or the earlier, 1958-73 
period (Table 3 ). However, this pattern changed significantly during the 
latter (1973-89) period (Table 4): 
1. During this period a clear pattern developed whereby increases in 
total expenditures were translated directly into expanded international indebt-
edness. For expenditures themselves the lag structure was fairly long, averag-
ing four years. That is increases in total government expenditures in the 
previous four years produced a significant increase in debt during the 
current year. 
2. The relationship between incrased government involvement in the 
economy and debt was less defined, with last year's increase in the share of 
government expenditures in GDP producing only a weak increase in debt. 
3. For defense, causation was reversed. Here increased debt tended to 
retard the expansion of defense expenditures. The lag was strong and oc-
curred only after a year - increases in debt in the previous year tended to 
reduce defense expenditures during the current year. As was the case for 
' Data is from the International Monetary Fund. Tests were performed using Regression 
Analysis For Time Series, RATS386 Version 4.0 (DoAN, 1992). 
628 ROBERT E. LOONEY 
TABLE 2 
PAKISTAN: INTERACTION OF 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES AND TOTAL DEBT, 1958-89 
Causation Patterns Dominant Pattern 
Debt I Debt Ex pen. \ Expen. 
Debt Expen. Expen. Debt 
Total Expenditures 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 1 2 1 No Rela-
I Final Prediction Error (273.59) (205.14) (152.12) (162.02) tionship 
Total Expenditures Share of GDP 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 1 3 1 No Rela-
Final Prediction Error (273.59) (289.14) (90.40) (96.19) tionship 
Defense Expenditures 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 1 2 1 No Rela-
Final Prediction Error (273.53) (280.15) (145.38) (154.84) tionship 
Defense Burden 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 1 2 1 Defense-> 
Final Prediction Error (273.53) (273.15) (143.20) (152.51) Debt (+w) 
Non-Defense Expenditures 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 1 1 1 No Rela-
Final Prediction Error (273.59) (274.94) (238.87) (254.31) ltionship 
Non-Defense Share of GDP 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 1 1 1 No Rela-
Final Prediction Error (273.59) (277.98) (183.84) (195.69) tionship 
NOTES: Summary of results obtained from Granger Causality Tests: A Hsiao Procedure was 
incorporated to determine the optimal lag. All variables are in the form of growth rates. The 
dominant pattern is that with the lowest final prediction error. The signs ( +, -) represent the 
direction of impact. In the case of feedback the signs refer to the second and fourth set of 
causation patterns (i.e., Defense/Revenues and Revenues/Defense). Each of the variables was 
regressed with 1, 2, 3, and 4 year lags. Strength assessment (s = strong; m = moderate; 
w = weak) based on the size of the standardized regression coefficient and t test of statistical 
significance. Defense burdens are the share of defense expenditures in GDP. Defense expendi-
tures are from: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook (New York: 
Oxford University Press), various issues. Economic data are from: International Monetary 
Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
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TABLE 3 
PAKISTAN: INTERACTION OF 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES AND TOTAL DEBT, 1958-73 
'. Dominant Causation Patterns Pattern 
Debt I Debt IExpen. IExpen. 
Debt Expen. Ex pen. Debt 
Total Expenditures 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 1 2 1 No Rela-
!Final Prediction Error (455.61) (494.00) (251.77) (284.64) tionship 
Total Expenditures Share of GDP 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 1 3 1 No Rela-
Final Prediction Error (455.61) (505.28) (178.17) (192.40) tionship 
Defense Expenditures 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 1 2 2 No Rela-
Final Prediction Error (455.61) (489.93) (312.39) (318.52) tionship 
Defense Burden 
Optimal Lag (yel!rs) 1 1 1 1 Defense-> 
Final Prediction Error (455.61) (473.41) (306.22) (294.83) Debt (+w) 
Non-Defense Expenditures 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 1 1 1 No Rela-
Final Prediction Error (455.61) (471.23) (400.13) (453.79) tionship 
Non-Defense Share of GDP 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 1 1 1 No Rela-
Final Prediction Error (455.61) (465.80) (320.63) (363.60) tionship 
NoTEs: Same as Table 2. 
total expenditures, the defense burden (the share of defense in GDP) fol-
lowed a pattern similar to total defense expenditures, albeit with a weaker 
:·~ response to increased indebtedness. 
4. Finally, non-defense expenditures were found to have a weak impact 
on total indebtedness. This lag averaged one year for expenditures and two 
years for their share in GDP. 
In general, the results suggest that links between expenditures and debt 
have strengthened over time. In addition, 'it is apparent that the composition 
of government expenditures (between defense and non-defense) affects the 
nature of this interaction with non-defense expenditures usually leading to 
future expansion in indebtedness and increased indebtedness tending to 
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PAKISTAN: INTERACTION OF GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURES AND TOTAL SECTOR DEBT, 1973-1989 
Causation Patterns 
Debt I Debt I Expen. I Expen. 
Debt I Expen. Expen. Debt 
Total Expenditures 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 4 1 2 
Final Prediction Error (141.14) (105.78) (48.03) (53.10) 
Total Expenditures Share of GDP 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 1 1 1 
Final Prediction Error (141.14) (140.61) (31.29) (34.69) 
Defense Expenditures 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 1 1 4 
Final Prediction Error (141.14) (158.87) (28.01) (26.99) 
Defense Burden 
Optimal Lag (years) 2 2 1 1 
Final Prediction Error (141.14) (159.91) (27.89) (26.97) 
Non-Defense Expenditures 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 2 1 1 
Final Prediction Error (141.14) (133.52) (102.31) (114.39) 
Non-Defense Share of GDP 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 1 1 1 
Final Prediction Error (141.14) (139.35) (83.74) (9.3.45) 
















retard the expansion of the government's allocations to defense. At this 
point however, it is impossible to say whether the links between defense 
come about because of debt servicing problems (diverting money from 
defense to foreign payments) on the part of the Pakistani government or 
whether the source of reduced rates of growth in defense stems from lender 
concern over the high (and presiimably unproductive) levels of Pakistani 
defense expenditures. 
The patterns are somewhat sharper for the disaggregative analysis. For 
~ .. 
... 
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example in the case of indebtedness to foreign governments over the time 
period as a whole 4 : 
1. The dominant pattern is one whereby increased debt facilitates 
future increases in both defense and non-defense activities. This effect is 
much stronger for defense, but in all cases the lag structure is fairly fong 
(averaging three to four years). That is increased external indebtedness 
gradually relaxes the fiscal constraints on expenditures. Again it should be 
stressed that in the case of defense the link between debt and expenditures 
are particularly strong. 
2. These patterns were also present in the earlier (19 5 8-7 3) period, 
although during this period the links between expanded debt and non-de-
fense expenditures were somewhat greater than those over the period as a 
whole. Again, the link is particularly strong between increased indebtedness 
to this source and the subsequent expansions in allocations to defense. 
3. Finally, in the latter (1973-89) period another pattern forms where-
by increased indebtedness begins to retard the expansion of defense expendi-
tures. Again the lag is fairly long with increased indebtedness over the 
previous four years negatively impacting on this year's defense expenditures. 
In the case of the defense burden, there is a week positive link between 
defense expenditures and debt. 
4. In contrast, non-defense expenditures appear to initiate future debt 
accumulation with increases in allocations to this category of expenditure 
last year producing a fairly strong increase in this year's indebtedness to 
foreign banks and governments. Again, this link is weaker for increases in 
the share of GDP allocated to non-defense budgetary categories. 
Summing up, again the relationship between expenditures and debt 
appears to have shifted over time. Pakistan's indebtedness to foreign banks 
and governments appears to have changed significantly with time. In earlier 
years lending by these organizations appears to have had the net effect of 
reducing fiscal constraints for all categories of expenditures. This may have 
developed because of the fungibility of these loans or because the banks 
and governments made general "bafance of payments loans". Over time the 
accrued debt either produced lender concern over future repayment or 
concern within Pakistan itself over debt serving. The net result was that in 
more recent years the accumulated debt from this source appears to have 
forced the government to restrain its allocations to the military. 
The links between the country's indebtedness to international institu-
' Due to space limitations the remaining findings are summarized. A full set of tables 
similar to Tables 2-4 are available upon request. 
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tions and its expenditures present even another pattern '. With regard to 
defense expenditures: 
1. For the period as a whole, increased defense expenditures have 
resulted in subsequent increases in indebtedness to these sources. The lag 
between increases in defense and debt is fairly short (averaging one year) 
and not particularly strong. More or less the same patterns characterized the 
relationship between the defense burden and indebtedness to the interna-
tional organizations. 
2. Again, no discernible patterns appear to have existed between de-
fense and debt from these organizations in the earlier (1958-73) time period. 
3. Finally, in more recent (1973-89) years debt appears to act as a force 
restraining allocations to defense. This pattern occurs for both defense ex-
penditures and the growth in their share of GDP (the defense burden). 
Here the lag is short (one year). However the restraining force from this 
source does not. appear to be as strong as that produced by increased 
indebtedness to foreign governments and banks. Also in the case of defense 
expenditures (but not the defense burden) increases in defense do result in 
subsequent increases in indebtedness to the international organizations. 
4. Interestingly enough, there were no statistically significant relation-
ships between expanded non-defense expenditures and expanded indebt-
edness to the international organizations. 
This final result is important in that nearly all of the loans from 
international institutions are for non-defense activities. The lack of any statis-
tically significant relationships between the debt accrued for this purpose 
and non-defense expenditures suggest that much of this funding is diverted 
to the defense budget. This is consistent with the evidence of fungibility of 
United States aid noted above. If this interpretation is correct it would also 
suggest that Pakistani concern over debt servicing and not lender concern 
over excessive military expenditures were responsible for the negative effect 
of indebtedness (to this source) on military spending. 
Conclusions 
With regard to the questions asked at the beginning of this paper: 
1. Defense expenditures in Pakistan have had a major role in affecting 
the country's external indebtedness~ This effect has shifted over time, with 
Pakistani defense expenditures clearly expanding external debt in the first 
' Because the analysis of total government expenditures did not lend anything to the 
analvsis, these results are omitted. 
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( 19 5 8-7 3) period. In recent years this link has weakened and if anything the 
debt accrued in the earlier period is currently acting as a constraining force 
on the government's allocations to the military. 
2. There are a number of fundamental differences between the way in 
which defense and non-defense allocations interact with external indebt-
edness. In general these links are much stronger for non-defense expend-
t itures. 
3. Also there are minor differences in the manner in which the debt to 
J;. foreign governments/banks and that to international organizations has af-
• fected government expenditures. 
• 
4. Over time foreign governments and banks appear to have sensed the 
fungibility of their lending to Pakistan. In recent years this may have led 
them to monitor more closely their lending to the country or to cut back 
lending when they sensed that funds were diverted to the military. This is 
evidenced by the fact that in the earlier time period a common pattern 
developed between debt and expenditures, both defense and non-defense. 
In more recent years, expenditures in non defense activities produced a 
subsequent increase in debt, with debt having a fairly strong retarding effect 
on defense. 
5. Interestingly enough, international organizations may have been 
willing to lend for increased defense expenditures. This is evidenced by the 
numerous causal linkages from defense to increased indebtedness with these 
international lending organizations. Similarly these organizations do not 
appear as concerned as governments and foreign banks over increased 
spending for military purposes in Pakistan. The forces retarding increased 
military expenditure due to indebtedness to this source may be more from 
Pakistani concern over debt servicing . 
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PAKISTAN, SPESE PER LA DIFESA E DEBITO ESTERO: MODELLI DI 
CAUSALITA E VINCOLO 
Scopo di questo articolo e di stabilire se e in che misura le spese per la dife-
sa del Pakistan hanno influenzato la sua posizione debitoria verso l'estero. Usando 
un modello di causalita di Granger modificato, ii principale risultato ottenuto e 
che le spese per la difesa del Pakistan hanno avuto un ruolo importantissimo nel 
determinate l'indebitamento estero del paese. Questo effetto e variato nel tempo 
in quanto le spese militari del Pakistan hanno decisamente fatto aumentare il de-
bito estero nel primo periodo (1958-73). In anni piu recenti, tuttavia, questa rela-
zione si e indebolita e se non altro il debito accumulato nel periodo precedente 
agisce ora come una forza frenante sugli stanziamenti militari del governo. 
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